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On January 24, 1973, Justice Harry Blackmun flew with one of his

law clerks to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the law clerk's hometown, to speak at
a chamber of commerce dinner.' To his great surprise, he was met by
dozens of anti-abortion picketers. The Supreme Court had issued Roe v.
Wade two days earlier.' "Picketed! -police protection," Blackmun noted
on the list he made of significant events in each Supreme Court term, a
chronology he maintained for his twenty-four years and for several years
into retirement.
From our perspective, knowing the impact Roe was to have on
American political culture, Blackmun's surprise may seem naive. But
from his perspective, of course, it made little sense that he should come
to personify an opinion that, while it bore his name, spoke for a seven-totwo Court. He had received an assignment, and he had discharged it to
the best of his ability. He was no crusader for abortion rights and, in fact,
found the idea of abortion personally distasteful. But as counsel to the
Mayo Clinic, he had spent formative professional years in the company
of doctors, whom he respected greatly. Prominent Mayo graduates and
staff members were among the growing numbers in the medical
profession who were advocating the reform of existing abortion laws.
Blackmun was persuaded that if a physician decided that terminating a

I. The episode is recounted in JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE
AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 5 (Basic Books 1998).
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (973).
3. Harry Blackmun, notes (Harry A. Blackmun Collection, Library of Congress Manuscript
Division [hereinafter HAB Collection], Container 1548, folder 4).
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pregnancy was indicated, that physician should not have to risk criminal
prosecution and prison for acting in the patient's best interest.
Those who have not read Roe v. Wade recently might well be
startled by its doctor-centric language and by the extent to which it
vindicates the rights of women only by proxy, through their doctors:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points
where important state interests provide compelling justifications for
intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects
is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision. And basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician. 4
The sixty-four-year-old man who wrote those words can be excused
for not anticipating that they would cause people to take to the streets or
that they would make him, for the rest of his own long life, the target of
epithets such as "baby-killer" and of regular death threats. Of the issues
on the Court's docket, Blackmun was more emotionally invested in the
death penalty, with which the Court was also wrestling in the mid-1970s.
Capital punishment rather than abortion appeared to many to be the
moral issue of the day, and Blackmun was engaged in a career-long
struggle to reconcile his personal opposition to the death penalty with his
view that judicial duty required him to refrain from interpreting the
Constitution to conform to his personal beliefs. Neither his nor any of
the other opinions in Roe give evidence of anywhere near that degree of
moral struggle, as Professor Powe recently pointed out: "Roe was a most
unique divisive case insofar as no one at the time saw it as divisiverecall the blandness of the Rehnquist and White dissents." 5
So we can understand Blackmun's shock at his reception in Cedar
Rapids, and at the vituperation that came his way in the ensuing weeks
and months. All of us know now what Harry Blackmun did not know
then: that Roe v. Wade would have a profound effect on American
political culture. My focus in this lecture is on the other side of that coin:
the impact of the decision upon its author. My thesis today, and the
thesis of my book, Becoming Justice Blackmun,' is that it was the
experience not of writing Roe but of living with its aftermath, of
defending it, and of eventually coming to identify with it in an intensely
personal way that changed Harry Blackmun profoundly and made him
the Justice he became. In embracing his legacy and in defending his
legacy, he created his legacy.
My book is aimed at a lay audience, and my editor would have shot
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66.
5. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Politics of American JudicialReview: Reflections on the Marshall, Warren,
and Rehnquist Courts,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 723 (2003).
6. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT
JOURNEY (Henry Holt/Times Books 2005).
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me if I had tried to slip in such an academic term as "path dependence"
to describe this phenomenon. So it is with some pleasurable anticipation
that I will try it out here, because I think it does fit, and further, that
considering Harry Blackmun's career in that light can deepen our
understanding not only of a singular American life, but of how the
mysterious intersection of the personal and the political can shape
history.
"Path dependence" is a concept not originally from law but from the
physical and biological sciences and through them to economics, from
which it has migrated into legal scholarship to help explain why different
societies have evolved different forms of corporate governance.'
Reduced to its core, it is a way of saying that eventual outcomes depend
on initial conditions, that "history matters" and that incremental, even
accidental choices or events can have outsized consequences. One
paradigmatic example of path dependence is the QWERTY typewriter
keyboard, an arrangement patented by its inventor and sold in 1873 to
the Remington typewriter company. The virtue of the QWERTY
arrangement was that it avoided the common problem of jammed
typewriter keys by separating the most widely used letters across the
keyboard. By forcing typists to go slower, it had the effect of enabling
them to type faster, and after the QWERTY keyboard won a famous
speed-typing competition in Cincinnati in i888, it became the industry
standard. It had such a head start that no other typewriter or keyboard
arrangement, no matter how ergonomically superior, has been able to
dislodge it. The phrase "path dependence" itself evokes a hypothetical
wagon road through the woods, a crooked road around which shops,
lodging, and eventually villages and towns grow up so that even later, in
the age of the automobile, when there is both the incentive and the
technology to replace the old crooked road with a straight highway, it is
too late-society has arranged itself along the bends in the road, and
bent the road must stay.
How does path dependence account for Harry Blackmun's career? It
is my thesis that three areas of his jurisprudence are directly attributable
to the fact of his having received the assignment to write for the majority
in Roe v. Wade: commercial speech, the rights of poor people, and
women's rights. In these three areas, his ever-tighter embrace of Roe
brought him to positions he would not otherwise have taken, and the
same personality traits that led him to self-identify so passionately with
the decision that bore his name meant that he clung just as tightly to the

7. See, e.g., Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nurture: Evolution, Path Dependence and Corporate
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 279 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and
Economics, IO9 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996).

Governance, I8

8. LaChance, supra note 7, at

291.
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positions he embraced in Roe's shadow.
First, to Roe itself. Although the world attached Roe to Harry
Blackmun almost immediately, he struggled for some time against that
perception. He had spoken for the Court, he would insist, and indeed,
the year-long construction of the majority opinions in Roe v. Wade and
the companion case Doe v. Bolton,9 both of which went through two
arguments, was a highly collaborative process. The concept of fetal
viability, instead of the first trimester, as the point at which the state's
interest in protecting potential fetal life becomes "compelling," for
example, was a contribution of Justice Lewis Powell that Blackmun
incorporated with the strong support of Justices Thurgood Marshall and
William Brennan.
There was a sense in which Blackmun continued to see himself as
almost an accidental bystander at a cataclysm. Roe was something that
"happened to me early in my years here," he noted to himself fifteen
years later." But as the attacks mounted-and they came not only from
religiously and ideologically committed foes of abortion rights but
broadly from within the legal academy-Blackmun's own identification
with the decision grew ever stronger. It is important to remember that
just as he was attacked, he was also lionized by abortion-rights and
women's-rights groups for whom this most modest of men became a
hero.
While Roe was still pending, a First Amendment case reached the
Court from Virginia. A newspaper editor in Charlottesville, Jeffrey C.
Bigelow, had published an advertisement for an abortion referral service
in New York, where a new state law had made abortion legal. Bigelow
had been convicted and fined $500 for violating a Virginia law that made
it a crime to "encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion" by means
of a lecture, an advertisement, "or in any other manner."' 2 The Virginia
Supreme Court, rejecting his First Amendment challenge, had ruled that
a "commercial advertisement" such as his "may be constitutionally
prohibited by the state."' 3 Under the Supreme Court's precedents, that
argument was quite likely correct. Commercial speech ranked near the
bottom of the hierarchy of First Amendment protection. In any event,
9. 410 U.S. 179 (1973)Io. Letter from Lewis Powell to Harry Blackmun (Nov. 29, 1972) (HAB Collection, Container
151, folder 4); Letter from Harry Blackmun to Lewis Powell (Dec. 4, 1972) (HAB Collection,
Container 151, folder 3); Memorandum from Harry Blackmun to the Conference (Dec. it, 1972)
(HAB Collection, Container 15I, folder 4); Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Harry Blackmun (Dec.
12, 1972) (HAB Collection, Container 151, folder 4); Letter from William Brennan to Harry
Blackmun (Dec. 13, 1972) (HAB Collection, Container 151, folder 8).
i i. Harry Blackmun, notes written in response to letter from David R. Gergen "(Apr. 5, 1988)
(HAB Collection, Container i44o, folder 2) (emphasis added).
12. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812-13 (1975).
13. See id. at 814.
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the Court held the Bigelow case for Roe and then sent it back to the
Virginia Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the fact that the
right to abortion was now the law of the land.'4 The Virginia court
reaffirmed Bigelow's conviction, and he filed a new Supreme Court
appeal. 5
Reviewing the briefs in advance of the argument in December i974,
Blackmun was immediately sympathetic to Bigelow's case. The First
Amendment "should prevent states from prohibiting advertisements of
products or conduct that is clearly legal at the place advertised," he
wrote in notes to himself. 6 A majority voted to reverse, and Chief Justice
Burger assigned the opinion to Blackmun. The result was Bigelow v.
Virginia,7 the Supreme Court's first declaration of First Amendment
protection for advertising. There is little doubt that Blackmun's interest
in the case was animated by the subject matter of the advertisement.
There is no evidence that he was thinking about how the issue might next
appear. But he had started down a path, and there was no turning back,
either for him or the Court.
Within a year, a new commercial speech case reached the Court,
once again from Virginia, in the form of a challenge to a state law that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.
"I have no great difficulty in concluding that the principles enunciated in
Bigelow are applicable here and that this statute must fall," Blackmun
wrote in notes to himself,' 8 preparing for the November 1975 argument in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.9 Once again, he got the assignment. Lewis Powell was

concerned that the opinion might open the way to constitutionally
protected advertising of fees by doctors and lawyers. To accommodate
that concern, Blackmun allowed Powell to add a footnote underscoring
the difference between the dispensing by pharmacists of standardized
products and the rendering of professional services by doctors and
lawyers." But it was only a matter of months before Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona"' placed the question of lawyer advertising on the Court's
docket. "Let it develop," Blackmun wrote to himself as he prepared for
the argument in January 1977 . " Burger was in dissent by this time, and
Blackmun received the assignment from Brennan. The path was clear.
14. Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973), remanded to 200 S.E.2d 68o (Va. 1973), rev'd, 421

U.S. 8o9 (1975).
15. Id.

16. Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 199, folders 8-9).
17. 421 U.S. at 8M8.
i8. Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 218, folders i-3).
19.
20.
21.
22.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 773 n.25.
433 U.S. 350 (977).
Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 252, folders 1-3).
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He just had to keep walking.
Another issue the Court was dealing with simultaneously with
abortion was poverty. Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in
United States v. Kras,23 a bankruptcy case that challenged the
constitutionality of requiring a $50 fee as a condition for filing for
bankruptcy, regardless of the bankruptcy petitioner's ability to pay.
Blackmun was skeptical of Robert Kras's claim that he was too poor to
pay the $50. Kras had turned down the chance to pay the fee in
installments, $1.28 a week for nine months, Blackmun noted in the memo
he wrote to himself before the argument in the fall of 1972.24 Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall-all strong allies of Blackmun's in
Roe-were in dissent, and the dissenting opinions were stinging. To
Blackmun's observation in his majority opinion that Kras could have
paid the fee for a weekly installment of "less than the price of a movie
and little more than the cost of a pack or two of cigarettes," Marshall
countered that "the desperately poor almost never go to see a movie,
which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity."
Blackmun was particularly gratified to hear from the government lawyer
who had argued the case, more than a year later, that Kras had paid the
$50 in full barely a month after the decision. 25
But not long after the Kras decision, poverty presented itself to the
Supreme Court in a new context: abortion. The question in a trio of cases
decided in the 1976 term was whether the states had a statutory or
constitutional obligation to pay for abortions for women who could not
afford them. The constitutional question was presented in a case from
Connecticut, Maher v. Roe.26 To Blackmun, the answer was obvious.
Connecticut was trying to "do indirectly what Roe says it cannot do
directly," Blackmun wrote in his pre-argument notes-namely, prevent
women from obtaining abortions. He characterized as "drastic and
disingenuous" the state's suggestion that any obstacle to abortion was de
because poor women would be able to find the necessary
minimis
27
money.
For the first time in a steady flow of abortion cases since Roe,
Blackmun was on the losing side. He was not surprised by Burger's
defection, but Stewart and Powell also abandoned him. William 0.
Douglas had retired the year before. His replacement, John Paul
Stevens, who was later to become one of the Court's very strongest
advocates for abortion rights, drew the line at public funding and joined
23. 409 U.S. 434,435 (i973).

24. Harry Blackmun, memo (HAB Collection, Container i56, folders 4-5).
25. Letter from Edward R. Korman to Harry Blackmun (June 17, 1974) (HAB Collection,
Container I56, folder 5).
26. 432 U.S. 464,466 (1977).
27. Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 246, folder i).
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the six-to-three majority that upheld the three challenged laws. "For the
individual woman concerned, indigent and financially helpless, as the
Court's opinions in the three cases concede her to be, the result is
punitive and tragic," Blackmun wrote in his dissenting opinion.' He
added:
There is another world 'out there,' the existence of which the court, I
suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize. And so the
cancer of poverty will continue to grow. This is a sad day for those who
regard the Constitution as a force that would serve justice to all
evenhandedly and, in so doing, would better the lot of the poorest
among us. 9

Obviously, the change of tone from the Kras opinion is striking:
suspicion replaced by empathy for the poor and even outrage at the
unfairness of their treatment by a hypocritical and duplicitous state.
Blackmun's outrage was due in part to his view of the merits, and in part
to his sense that the Court was changing, that support for Roe-as he
understood Roe-was weakening, and that those he had counted as allies
had betrayed him. The abortion funding cases did indeed open Harry
Blackmun's eyes to the other world "out there," a perspective he was to
adopt across a range of cases for the remaining seventeen years of his
Supreme Court career, most famously in his "poor Joshua!" dissent in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.3 In that
dissent, he adopted a strikingly personal and non-judicial tone to give
voice to a little boy left brain-damaged by his violent father into whose
custody the state-employed social workers, ignoring abundant warning
signs, had placed him. Joshua's injury, while tragic, was not
constitutionally cognizable, the majority held.
In addition to serving as a bridge to the world "out there," the
abortion funding cases also marked the beginning of a repositioning in
Harry Blackmun's mind of the abortion issue itself. The funding cases,
after all, were not about doctors; they were about women-pregnant,
alone, poor, and in need. Blackmun and the Court came late to women's
rights. For years, the abortion cases and the sex discrimination cases,
which advocates including Ruth Bader Ginsburg were rationing and
shepherding toward the Court in a carefully considered litigation
campaign, ran on separate parallel tracks, as if they could not possibly
have anything doctrinally to do with one another. And indeed, until the
abortion cases came to be seen as cases about women, there was no
reason for these two tracks to converge.
It was an awkward time, during which the Court lurched forward
and back, struggling to understand a world in which age-old practices
28. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,462 (976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 463.
30. 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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were suddenly being challenged as unconstitutionally discriminatory. The
fact that many of the cases Ruth Bader Ginsburg brought to the Court
had male plaintiffs, challenging paternalistic laws that favored women in
various government benefits, did not make the Court's job any easier,
because to the nine men of the Supreme Court, the premises behind
these laws-that women tended to need protection and financial support
more than men did-made a good deal of sense and seemed, at the least,
well-intentioned even if not carefully tailored.
What to do, for example, about something like maternity leave?
Mandatory (and unpaid) maternity leaves were extremely common,
especially in public school systems, where teachers were expected to
leave the classroom before their pregnancy would become visible to
students. Those of us old enough to have been in public school in those
days remember when young, pretty, and popular teachers would simply
disappear, failing to come back from Christmas vacation, for example,
and likely never to return. A pair of cases challenging these policies
arrived early in the I973 term. Most of the Justices thought the policies
were unfair, but three years before Craig v. Boren" made sex
discrimination subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, they lacked the
constitutional vocabulary to express what, exactly, the problem was.
Certainly, this was the position Harry Blackmun was in. In his preargument memo for one of the cases, Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,32 we can see him struggling to get a handle on the issue:
It is easy to say initially that any regulation which relates to
pregnancy is automatically and per se sex discriminatory. I am not at
all certain that this is necessarily so. Actually, what the regulation does
is to draw distinctions between classes of women, that is, those who are
pregnant and those who are not pregnant, rather than between male
and female. It is somewhat similar to an Army regulation requiring
that enlisted men be shaved and not wear beards or mustaches. Such a
regulation discriminates between one class of men and another class of
men, and not as between men and women.33
At the top of this typewritten memo, Blackmun added a handwritten
note: "Not sex related."
He eventually joined Potter Stewart's majority opinion that
invalidated the mandatory leave policies in LaFleur and a companion
case. The Court decided the cases on the basis of due process rather than
equal protection. The word "discrimination" did not appear in the
opinion. A Court that had confidently announced the right to abortion
only a year earlier was evidently tongue-tied in the presence of pregnant
schoolteachers.
31. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
32. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
33. Harry Blackmun, memo (HAB Collection, Container 175, folder I).
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Blackmun did not appreciate the campaign Ruth Ginsburg was
conducting on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's
Rights Project, beginning with Reed v. Reed 4 in 1971, at the start of
Blackmun's second term on the Court. This case challenged an Idaho
probate law under which a man received an automatic preference for
court appointment to administer an estate. The state court had upheld
the preference, finding it justified by administrative convenience and
neither "illogical nor arbitrary."35 The Supreme Court unanimously
disagreed, overturning the law on equal protection grounds in a rather
cryptic six-page opinion by Warren Burger. Harry Blackmun went along,
but he was not particularly happy. "The ACLU, on behalf of the
appellant mother here, has filed a very lengthy brief filled with emotion
and historical context about the inferior status of women," he wrote in
notes to himself while preparing for the argument. After the argument,
when it was clear that the lower court would be reversed, he wrote:
37
"Avoid an emotional opinion about women's rights. Write it narrowly."
I looked at the brief in the Court's library to try to see what there
was about it that drew Blackmun's negative reaction. It was fairly long, at
sixty-eight pages, but not drastically longer than many other merits
briefs. It cited Gunnar Myrdal and a variety of social commentators and
critics, seeking to get into the Court's record and into the Justices'
consciousness the disadvantaged status of women in society. "A person
born female continues to be branded inferior for this congenital and
unalterable condition of birth," was one typical sentence-hardly a
radical observation, even back in 1971.'s What the brief in Reed v. Reed
did ask for, however, was something the Court was unwilling to give,
either then, or two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,39 or until this
very day: to apply strict judicial scrutiny to claims of discrimination on
the basis of sex.
Although he was the father of three daughters, one of whom later
became a lawyer, Harry Blackmun was not an easy sell. In November
i980, in anticipation that a woman might join the Court someday, Potter
Stewart proposed dropping the traditional "Mr. Justice" in favor of a sexneutral title. The justices collectively agreed to make the change, over
Blackmun's objection. "It seems to me that of late we tend to panic and
to get terribly excited about some rather inconsequential things," he
wrote in a letter addressed to Chief Justice Burger and circulated to the

34. 404 U.S. 71 ('97').
35. Reed v. Reed, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho

197o).

36. Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 135, folder Io).
37. Id.
38. Brief for Appellant at 25, Reed, 404 U.S. 71, (No. 70-4), 1971 WL 133596.
39. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
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other Justices.4' "I regard this as one of them ...we seem to be
eliminating, step by step, all aspects of diverseness, and we give impetus
to the trend toward a colorless society."'" The next year, of course, saw
the arrival of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
Yet despite his instincts, and very much to his credit, Harry
Blackmun kept an open mind. He kept listening. In 1975, for example,
Ruth Ginsburg argued Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,4 a challenge to a
federal social security provision that granted certain benefits to widows
that it withheld from widowers. Blackmun's law clerk urged him to vote
to uphold the differential. "No doubt, the statute's provision rests on a
stereotype-a stereotype that has greatly diminished validity," the law
clerk, Richard Blumenthal-now the attorney general of Connecticutwrote to the Justice, adding that "[w]omen are more likely to be needy,
even in this increasingly liberated age."43 Blackmun was inclined to agree,
as his own notes indicate. "So long as the objective of the differential is
to alleviate need, I suspect that we shall have to hold that the differential
is not unconstitutional," he wrote before the argument.' But he took
notes on the bench as Ginsburg made her case that the provision violated
equal protection. "It is a good clean case, factually," he wrote to himself.
'
"The differential does seem rather useless."45
Blackmun joined
Brennan's majority opinion that found the provision unconstitutional.
But still he struggled to understand the essence of the claim of
unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sex. The claim kept
appearing in contexts where Blackmun simply did not see a problem that
needed to be addressed with such a powerful instrument as a
constitutional holding. For example, in a 1982 case, Mississippi University
of Women v. Hogan,4 he resisted the arguments of his law clerk and the
force of Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion, remaining resolutely
in dissent from the Court's holding that the state's exclusion of men from
a public nursing program-the only one of several such programs in the
Mississippi system that was not open to both sexes-violated the Equal
Protection guarantee. His dissenting opinion warned against the
imposition of "needless conformity," adding: "I have come to suspect
that it is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of claimed sex
discrimination, and to lose-indeed destroy-values that mean much to

40. Letter from Harry Blackmun to Warren Burger (HAB collection, Container 1548, folder 4).
41. Id.
42. 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (i975).
43. Letter from Richard Blumenthal, law clerk to Harry Blackrmun, to Harry Blackmun (HAB
Collection, Container 203, folder 6).
44. Harry Blackmun, notes (HAB Collection, Container 203, folder 6).
45. Id.

46. 458 U.S. 718,733 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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some people by forbidding the State to offer them a choice while not
depriving others of an alternative choice."
At the same time, however, there was another force at work on
Harry Blackmun. The abortion debate was changing-ironically, in part
because of Sandra Day O'Connor's arrival and her willingness to express
deep skepticism about the foundations of Roe v. Wade in the 1983 Akron
case, the first case to address abortion since she joined the Court.47
Barely a decade old, Roe was on the defensive, and so was Blackmun.
His sense of what Roe had sought to accomplish began to change. The
change had begun with his dissenting opinion in the abortion funding
cases, in the shift in his focus from all-knowing doctors to desperate and
needy women, and now the change accelerated. He held onto a five-tofour majority in the 1986 Thornburgh case, concluding with a strongly
worded description of the meaning of the right to choose abortion: "Few
decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy...." 4 By the time of
Blackmun's dissent in the 1989 Webster case, 9 his linguistic, intellectual,
and emotional focus was entirely on women. It was for them that he was
holding back the tide, for them that he had become a most improbable
icon.
And so in the last years of his career, the sex discrimination cases
and the abortion cases, after running on parallel tracks for so long, began
to converge. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey," the 1992 decision thatwith Sandra Day O'Connor's crucial assistance-preserved the right to
abortion, equal protection entered Blackmun's abortion discourse for the
first time. He explicitly embraced a unified jurisprudence of women's
rights that saw reproductive freedom as an essential aspect of women's
equality:
A State's restrictions on a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State
restrictions on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they
otherwise might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate
pregnancies, the State conscripts women's bodies into its service,
forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of
childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The
State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it
assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of course. This
assumption-that women can simply be forced to accept the 'natural'
status and incidents of motherhood-appears to rest upon a

47. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 46 (1983).
48. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,772 (1986).
49. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
50. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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conception of women's role that has triggered the protection of the
Equal Protection Clause.'
And then Blackmun did something remarkable. He cited
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, from which he had dissented ten years earlier. The convergence
was complete.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the Court the next year. She and
Blackmun were to spend only one term together, because the 1993 term
would be his last. One of his final opinions, which he assigned to himself
during his brief tenure as Senior Associate Justice, was J.E.B. v.
Alabama,2 a case on discriminatory jury selection, which extended to sex
the rule of Batson v. Kentucky 53-that peremptory challenges could not
be used to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race. "We hold that
gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality," Blackmun wrote for the majority." In deference to
Ginsburg, he included a footnote that treated as still open the question of
whether sex discrimination should be subject to strict scrutiny; because
sex-based jury challenges failed even intermediate scrutiny, it was not
necessary in this case to revisit the issue on which Ginsburg had failed to
persuade the Court so long ago." While joining the majority in J.E.B.,
Ruth Ginsburg said nothing. She had no need to. Harry Blackmun had,
improbably, said it all for her.
Before concluding this account of Harry Blackmun's journey, I
should mention one other element. For the first sixteen years of his
tenure on the Court, he shared the bench with his boyhood friend
Warren Burger. When he came to the Court in the second year of
Burger's chiefship, Blackmun was deeply fond and admiring of his
lifelong acquaintance, for whom he had served as a public cheerleader
and-as his collected papers make clear-private emotional bulwark.
Blackmun was also acutely sensitive to being described dismissively as
Burger's "Minnesota twin," and the story of his career on the Court is in
some substantial measure the story of his path from Warren Burger's
side to independence.
That path, too, began with Roe v. Wade. Burger made the
assignment but-in contrast to other members of the Roe majority, who
at least offered Blackmun empathy and emotional support-never
evinced a willingness to share the burden. In fact, he began sniping at
Roe almost immediately, and within a few years had abandoned it.

51. Id. at 928.
52.

511 U.S. 127

(1994).

53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54. J.E.B., 5 11 U.S. at 129.
55. Id. at 137 n.6.
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Neither man recognized it at the time, of course, but Burger's betrayalwhich is how Blackmun saw it-freed Blackmun to go his own way, free
from private ties and the public shadow of twinship. Path dependence
was also a road to independence, to Becoming Justice Blackmun.
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